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In 2011 public sector management is at a crossroads, 
without a clear way ahead. Politicians in New Zealand and 
comparable jurisdictions, such as Australia (Advisory Group 
on the Review of Australian Government Administration, 
2010), are searching for new thinking on how to improve 
public sector performance. Some practitioners have 
responded by seeking to repackage long-standing ideas in 
an effort to extract improved performance from existing 
systems. In New Zealand, different governments have 
introduced marginal, piecemeal additions to the current 
system. Most recently 
additions have focused on 
improving the economy of 
departmental operations 
(Better Administrative and 
Support Services (BASS); 
shared services) and 
filling gaps (Performance 
Improvement Framework 
(PIF)). The piecemeal 
nature of these initiatives 
means they are unlikely to 
significantly improve the 
effectiveness of performance 
and the overall coherence 
of the public management 
system.
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Meanwhile, academics pronounce the 
‘death’ of new public management 
(Dunleavy et al., 2006) and foresee the 
emergence of ‘new public governance’ 
(Osborne, 2006), though without 
a consensus as to what new public 
governance actually means. Other, more 
reflective practitioners are searching for 
a new ‘synthesis’ (Bourgon, 2008), but 
what needs to be synthesised or what the 
direction for any change should be is not 
yet clear (Lindquist, 2011).
In the past New Zealand has shown 
an ability to forge ahead with path-
breaking public sector reform. It was the 
first country to introduce output-based 
budgeting and accrual accounting in the 
public sector. Yet over the last 20 years 
we have failed in our attempts to move 
from a dominant outputs-based to a 
more outcome-focused management 
system (Gill, 2008). Recent research 
on organisational performance in the 
state sector found that, with some 
notable exceptions, as a general rule 
public organisations were tactically 
managing resources through processes 
to deliver outputs with a varying focus 
on outcomes (Gill, 2011, ch.16). In short, 
in New Zealand public organisations are 
reporting for outcomes not managing 
for outcomes.  
This article suggests that the time 
is right for New Zealand to commit 
to moving to a greater formal use of 
outcome-focused management.1 There 
are a number of reasons to do so:
• outcomes build on the professional 
pride and basic motivation of public 
sector employees who come to work 
in order to make a difference to the 
lives of ordinary New Zealanders;
• New Zealand faces a sustained fiscal 
affordability problem that cannot 
be addressed by searching for 
economies in existing operations of 
public agencies (see discussion in 
Gill et al., 2010, pp.34-5, which draws 
on Treasury’s 2009 long-term fiscal 
statement);
• we have the opportunity to learn 
from the experimentation under way 
elsewhere  (‘necessity is the mother 
of invention’) in the face of fiscal 
pressures, and the experiences of 
other leading jurisdictions (such as 
Oregon) that have sustained a focus 
on achieving outcomes.
Strategies to achieve a step change 
We propose in this article a number of 
possible strategies for improving the 
outcomes focus of public organisations 
and thus improving state sector per-
formance. We do not propose one best way. 
Instead, we present five alternative, broad-
based strategies that differ in the source of 
leadership on outcomes – chief executives 
and senior leaders within departments, 
ministers or independent goal-setters 
– and the relative emphasis placed on 
outputs compared to outcomes and thus 
improving state sector performance.
There are also areas for change 
that could, indeed should, be 
implemented as part of or alongside 
all of the stategies discussed in this 
article. Such ‘common strands’ are 
aimed at increasing the contribution of 
organisational performance information 
to improved public sector performance 
by moving away from the one-size-fits-
all approach that was adopted in the 
implementation of the formal system. 
Common strands address increasing the 
leadership provided by agencies at the 
centre; improving output specification 
and clarity of appropriations; more 
closely examining longer-term outcome 
trends and strengthening the use of an 
evalutative lens; allowing variation in the 
frequency and focus of external reporting 
and audit requirementts; facilitating 
external analysis of organisational 
performance data; and strengthening 
incentives at the chief executive. 
We set out alternative strategies in 
order to bring out the often unarticulated 
assumptions that are made about 
what stops public organisations from 
becoming more outcomes-focused. 
Some of the options propose managerial 
solutions, such as using performance 
standards to control the exercise of 
delegated authority. The thrust of 
these strategies is to change aspects of 
the formal performance management 
system design in order to reinforce 
the desired changes in practice within 
the state sector. They are all, however, 
Table 1: Strategy 1, outcomes leadership at service and policy levels
Dimensions Elements
Purpose External 
organisational 
accountability
Objective-setting 
– how
Led by chief executive
Locus Individual agency Organisational 
performance 
information and 
development 
– where the 
emphasis lies
Focus kept on outputs
Focus on agency 
outcomes de-
emphasised
Focus Outputs Monitoring 
– where and how 
performance 
information is 
monitored
Service performance 
information used 
in chief executives’ 
performance reviews 
and linked to 
remuneration
Scope Comprehensive 
outputs reporting, 
with reduced 
emphasis on 
outcomes
Performance 
information reporting
– where and how 
performance 
information is 
reported
Quality of output 
performance 
information improved 
and requirement for 
outcome information 
reduced
Decision rights 
– where they are 
assigned
Formal decision 
rights of ministers 
strengthened
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essentially technical solutions that take 
as given the authorising environment 
created by New Zealand’s Westminster 
– and mixed-member proportional – 
system of government. In particular, 
they take as given Ladley’s ‘iron rule 
of politics’ that the opposition, in 
undertaking its constitutional role, uses 
performance information ‘not to improve 
the functioning of the Executive but in 
order to attack the Executive’ (Prebble, 
2010, p.3). 
An authorising environment 
dominated by Ladley’s iron rule of politics 
will affect the way performance measures 
are developed, used and reported in public 
organisations. Managerial solutions 
cannot, by themselves, address what are 
principally political problems –they will 
not take the politics out of politics. 
Strategy 1: outcomes leadership at the 
service and policy levels
Strategy 1 builds on the firm foundation 
of output-based management already 
established in New Zealand by de-
emphasising and removing outcomes 
from service performance reporting, and 
uncoupling outcomes from the iron rule 
of political contest. Under this strategy, 
the Public Finance Act 1989 would be 
amended to remove statutory references 
to outcomes. The locus of performance 
information reporting would remain 
individual agencies and the purpose 
would remain external accountability (see 
Table 1 for more details). Having removed 
outcomes from accountability, the focus 
on outcomes under this strategy is more 
as a bottom-up organisational learning 
tool at the client service level, and for 
informing high-quality policy. 
Strategy 1 recognises that the 
imperative for control remains dominant 
in the face of the requirements of an 
authorising environment dominated by 
the ‘iron rule of political contest’, and 
shifts outcomes from the accountability 
space. The key to the success of the 
strategy is creating space to explore 
outcomes by decoupling outcomes from 
the blame game of accountability and 
making accountability more meaningful.  
The strategy, which we call ‘building 
on the basics around outputs’, works 
within the constraints of the authorising 
environment and constitutional 
requirements, particularly with respect to 
Parliament’s role in authorising ministers 
to incur expenditure through their 
departments. From a political perspective, 
attempting to make the reforms of 20 
years ago work is a ‘realist’ strategy, in that 
it recognises the day-to-day operation of 
the authorising environment and the iron 
rule of political contest. 
The strategy involves modifying the 
formal system to make it more consistent 
with practice. In so doing and to achieve 
a step change, this strategy returns to 
aspects of those reforms as originally 
contemplated, with a strong leaning 
towards high-powered incentives, such as 
the retention by departments of surpluses 
and the review of chief executive 
performance based on organisational 
performance. In keeping with its political 
realism, the strategy does not, however, 
return to notions such as ministers 
as active purchasers of the goods and 
services provided by departments (and 
others).
The next three strategies take a 
different tack, as they all involve putting 
outcomes on centre stage by focusing 
on strengthening leadership around 
outcomes, in the current authorising 
environment. This responds to two 
complementary facets of observed 
practice:
• limited involvement of ministers 
in setting outcomes, and outright 
resistance to outcome targets, which 
have resulted in an absence of shared 
strategy and priorities (context) for 
shaping departmental operations;
• the frequency of a compliance-
focused approach to outcome (and 
output) reporting by departments, 
to the detriment of both meaningful 
accountability and organisational 
learning.
In a sense, the next three strategies 
are variants on the same broad approach 
which differ depending on whether 
leadership on outcomes comes from chief 
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Table 2: Strategy 2, chief executives leading outcomes
Dimensions Elements
Purpose Decision-making 
(including priority 
setting and resource 
allocation) 
Objective-setting 
– how
Outcome 
development led by 
chief executive 
Locus Clusters of agency 
activities contributing 
to specific outcome 
areas
Organisational 
performance 
information and 
development 
– where the 
emphasis lies
Sector and high-
level outcomes 
and organisational 
outcomes hierarchies
Focus Outcomes, with 
contributions from 
multiple agencies
Monitoring 
– where and how 
performance 
information is 
monitored
Contribution to 
collective used in 
chief executive 
performance reviews
Scope Outcomes, high-level 
and organisation-
specific, with 
reference to outputs / 
other interventions
Performance 
information reporting 
– where and how 
performance 
information is 
reported
No additional external 
reporting, some 
reduced output 
reporting
Decision rights
– where they are 
assigned
Role of chief 
executives in 
intervention selection 
strengthened
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executives and senior leaders, ministers 
and chief executives jointly, or ministers.
The final strategy, starts from 
the position that accountability for 
performance requires change in the ‘two 
cultures’ of the political world (ministers 
and Parliament) and the managerial world 
(public officials) (Prebble, 2010., p.50).
Strategy 2: chief executives leading 
outcomes
Strategy 2 involves chief executives 
leading outcomes, with the recommended 
approach to performance reporting plac-
ing a greater emphasis on cross-agency 
outcomes and a reduced emphasis on 
output-class information at an individual 
agency level. Organisational performance 
would become increasingly selective 
and differentiated by being tailored to 
different decision makers. Thus, the focus 
would shift to selected outcomes (with 
the locus of attention across agencies) and 
the purpose would shift to learning and 
internal decision making (see Table 2).
This strategy is based on the view 
that underpinning the lack of sustained 
progress on responsibility for outcomes 
is political constraint. It appears that 
New Zealand politicians are reluctant to 
commit themselves to specific measurable 
targets because they believe they could be 
‘held hostage to fortune’.2 This option 
would reinforce current joint working 
among chief executives and their staff 
(discussed in a March 2010 Cabinet paper) 
such as the community links programme 
(integrated tax and social assistance), and 
joint border sector governance.
This approach builds on the 
professional pride senior public sector 
leaders have in wanting to make a difference 
despite the somewhat hostile authorising 
environment. The determinant of 
success will be chief executive leadership, 
augmented by astute support from the 
central agencies. Selected chief executives 
would develop high-level outcomes and 
cross-organisational interventions,3 with 
all chief executives integrating those 
outcomes and interventions into the 
planning and priority-setting for their 
respective organisations. This approach 
would involve chief executives leading 
the development of end-to-end solutions 
for particular public policy problems, 
including acting as champions for 
particular management issues, such as 
measurement, organisational learning 
and evaluation.
Strategy 3: joint leadership of outcomes
This strategy involves establishing a 
strategic management system as the 
centrepiece for the organisational 
performance management system. In 
summary, this approach to improving 
performance reporting builds on the 
government’s policy priority-setting 
process and cascades this down through 
sector-level outcome information and 
into individual public agencies. 
There would be reduced emphasis on 
comprehensive reporting of  performance 
information at an individual agency 
level and greater focus on sector-level 
achievements. Perfromance reporting 
would become increasingly selective, 
focused on societal outcomes and 
strategic priorities, (with inevitable cross-
agency boundaries) and be tailored to 
different decision makers (see table 3).  To 
be effective, this strategy would require 
a quality policy development process 
to establish rigorous intervention logic, 
backed up by investment in an outcome 
measurement system. 
New Zealand has led the world 
in this area before.4 The strategic 
management system could be based on 
the government’s strategic priorities,5 
akin to the system of strategic result areas 
and key result areas under the previous 
National administration (1990–99), or 
an enhanced version of the government’s 
priorities under the 1999–2008 Labour-
led administration. Other jurisdictions 
have been successful in implementing 
formal systems allocating accountabilities 
to ministers and chief executives and 
cascading planning, priority-setting and 
performance targets – in particular in the 
‘state-level planning’ initiatives in sub-
national government in Australia, Canada 
Table 3: Strategy 3, joint leadership of outcomes
Dimensions Elements
Purpose Decision-making 
(including priority-
setting and resource 
allocation) 
Objective setting 
– how
Joint ministerial–
chief executive 
leadership of strategic 
management system 
focused on high-level 
outcomes
Locus Clusters of individual 
agencies’ activities 
contributing to priority 
outcomes
Organisational 
performance 
information and 
development 
– where the 
emphasis lies
Cascade from 
government outcomes 
to agency outcomes
Focus Selected priority 
outcomes and 
activities
Monitoring 
– where and how 
performance 
information is 
monitored
Information on 
intervention (and 
delivery approach) 
selection and use 
of evidence used 
in chief executive 
performance reviews
Scope Selective outcome 
reporting, with 
reduced emphasis 
on and variability in 
outputs reporting
Performance 
information reporting
– where and how 
performance 
information is 
reported
Contribution to 
agency outcomes the 
focus
Decision rights 
– where they are 
assigned
Formal steering 
role of ministers 
strengthened
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and the United States. The principal 
learning from New Zealand’s experience 
is that a strategic management system is 
particular to the government of the day, 
and previous systems have not withstood 
a change of prime ministers.
As with the previous strategies, 
this approach is based on the view that 
political restraint underpins the lack of 
sustained progress on responsibility for 
outcomes. This approach is, however, a 
strengths-based approach which builds 
on political leadership practice within 
the current legislative framework and 
authorising environment. Consideration 
could be given to simplifying reporting 
requirements, by removing service 
performance reports from the current 
attest audit approach6 and removing 
financial reporting from annual 
departmental reports. Departmental 
financial statements could be made 
available on Treasury’s website as 
part of the financial statements of the 
government, or on each department’s 
website. The chief executive performance 
management process could be amended 
by explicitly including progress against the 
agency’s main priorities in the review.
Strategy 4: legislating for outcomes at the 
centre
The fourth strategy involves legislating for 
outcomes at the centre, building on the 
foundations of the Public Finance Act 1989 
relating to outcomes that have never been 
realised. The strategy would aim to achieve 
a subtle but important rebalancing of the 
formal system to include responsibility 
for outcomes as well as accountability of 
outputs.
This strategy aims to enhance the 
design of the formal performance 
management system by providing an 
explicit role for ministerial leadership of 
outcomes. This design would have as its 
centrepiece a statutory requirement for 
ministers to assume formal responsibility 
for the articulation of outcomes, including 
performance information (indicators and 
targets), and reporting results. This variant 
involves similar clarity in new areas as 
already exist for the government’s fiscal 
strategy under the fiscal responsibility 
provisions in the Public Finance Act 
1989.7 The option is based on the view 
that underpinning the lack of sustained 
progress on outcome performance 
information is the incompleteness in the 
design of the system due to a political 
constraint. Nonetheless, this strategy 
works within the current authorising 
environment.
The potential for this strategy to 
drive change in practice will depend on 
the extent to which ministerial outcome 
responsibility statements (and the 
attendant changes) address the constraint 
imposed by an authorising environment 
dominated by the ‘iron rule of political 
contest’.
The previous strategies all involve 
relatively modest change to the 
authorising environment, and risk making 
a limited contribution to achieving a step 
change in organisational performance 
management. It is to this constraint that 
discussion of strategy 5 turns, starting 
from the position that accountability for 
performance requires change in the ‘two 
cultures’ of the political world (ministers 
and Parliament) and the managerial 
world (public officials) (Prebble, 2010, 
page 50).
Strategy 5: reframing the political contest
Strategy 5 – reframing the political contest 
– is the sea-change option, which aims 
to achieve transformational change by 
altering the authorising environment. 
This strategy involves moving from 
oppositional politics to a more consensual 
multi-party and community-based 
approach to improving performance. The 
aim is to shift the political constraint that 
has limited sustained progress on outcome 
performance information by creating a 
political circuit-breaker that disrupts the 
iron rule of political contest.
The premise for Strategy 5, therefore, 
is that it is not possible to get traction 
with improving public management 
performance without changing the more 
important or dominant characteristics 
Table 4: Strategy 4, legislating for outcomes at the centre
Dimensions Elements
Purpose Ministerial 
accountability
Objective setting 
– how
Ministerial outcome 
responsibility 
statements
Locus Ministerial portfolios, 
flowing into clusters 
of agencies
Organisational 
performance 
information and 
development 
– where the 
emphasis lies
Organisational 
outcomes hierarchies 
and measures in 
ministerial statements 
anchored
Focus Ministers – sector 
outcomes
Organisational – 
specific outcomes 
hierarchies
Monitoring 
– where and how 
performance 
information is 
monitored
Quality of outcomes-
thinking used in 
chief executive 
performance reviews
Scope Ministers – 
intervention choices 
(comprehensive)
Organisational – 
outputs and capability 
(comprehensive)
Performance 
information reporting
– where and how 
performance 
information is 
reported
Annual report by 
ministers against their 
outcome responsibility 
statements
Annual report by 
organisations against 
organisational 
outcomes hierarchies 
and outputs (limited)
Decision rights
– where they are 
assigned
Steering role of 
and selection 
of interventions 
by ministers 
strengthened
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of the authorising environment, even 
if only by chipping away at them. In 
a nutshell, this strategy would involve 
broadening the focus of change to cover 
elements of the authorising environment 
and repositioning the nature of the 
relationships between the bureaucracy, 
ministers, the legislature and the wider 
public. Strategy 5 has the potential to 
achieve transformational change. This 
strategy is based on breaking the ‘blame 
game’ by moving to a more community-
based and consensual multi-party 
approach to improving performance, 
and, as part of that, to more shared 
arrangements for policy making. To 
be effective, ‘breaking the blame game’ 
would require high-quality engagement 
and genuine buy-in, as well as the 
development of credible and accessible 
state reports against benchmarks. In the 
process, this strategy has the potential 
to shift political discourse into a more 
outcome- and evidence-informed space.
The strategy starts from the 
proposition that there is space for political 
convergence around big policy outcomes. 
Although the politics is intermittently 
drawn to the lightning rod of values 
trade-offs between societal outcomes, 
generally the substance of current policy 
debate is about the best means to achieve 
the outcomes. Importantly, this approach 
would build a platform for performance 
dialogue that emphasises improvement 
and rectification over fault-finding and 
retribution.
As with the previous strategies, this 
approach involves a change in leadership 
style by shifting the focus away from 
agency-level output management 
towards an explicit performance context 
of outcome ‘goals’ and benchmarks, 
within which organisations shaped 
their performance and could assess 
their contribution to improving societal 
outcomes. This environment would 
provide a powerful framework within 
which staff could be empowered to make 
a difference. If successful, the strategy 
would result in societal outcomes that 
stand as enduring features of the political 
landscape, not political slogans linked to 
one administration.
As with the previous strategies, the 
increased emphasis on selective reporting 
and the development of new outcome-
related performance indicators could 
be accompanied by a move to more 
selective and variable reporting, based on 
size, customer and function. The chief 
executive performance management 
process would be amended by including 
in the review an examination of chief 
executives’ understanding of progress 
against the outcome indicators, and 
their effectiveness in balancing political 
pressures with longer-term outcome 
achievement.
What is to be done?
When considering these strategies, it 
is important to distinguish between 
limitations or parameters that can be 
changed and constraints that cannot. In 
this context limitations are the design 
variables or parameters that were specific 
to the New Zealand public management 
model of organisational management. 
These limitations need to be clearly 
distinguished from the constraints that 
are inherent in politics, people and 
public services, and that are faced by any 
conceivable public management model. 
Limitations specific to the New Zealand 
public management model, which by 
their nature can be considered for change, 
include characteristics that:
• are inherent in the design of the 
formal system;
• reflect incompleteness in the design 
of the formal system;
• reflect poor implementation (incon-
sistent with the design and not design 
flaws).
Table 5: Strategy 5, reframing the political contest
Dimensions Elements
Purpose Public participation 
and dialogue, and 
organisational 
learning
Objective setting 
– how
Societal-level 
outcomes, 
benchmarks and 
measures set by 
Kiwis’ Council (or 
equivalent)
Locus Independent analysis 
of credible societal 
outcomes information
Organisational 
performance 
information and 
development 
– where the 
emphasis lies
Organisational 
outcomes hierarchies 
and measures 
anchored in societal 
outcomes
Focus Independent – 
societal outcomes
Organisational – 
specific hierarchies
Monitoring – where 
and how performance 
information is 
monitored
Quality of outcomes 
thinking used in 
chief executive 
performance reviews
Scope Societal – 
comprehensive 
outcomes reporting
Organisational – 
specific outcome 
reporting
Performance 
information reporting
– where and how 
performance 
information is 
reported
Societal outcomes 
reported 
independently, 
and regularly (less 
frequently than 
annual and varying 
cycles)
Annual reports 
against organisational 
outcomes hierarchies 
and outputs by 
organisations
Decision rights
– where they are 
assigned
Following community 
engagement, societal 
outcomes are 
determined
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Constraints faced by any conceivable 
public management system, are inherent 
in:
• politics, specifically in Westminster 
democracies;
• people – their limits and bounded 
rationality;
• public services, with several services 
provided by governments having 
limited comparability with services 
provided in the private sector (and so 
limited competition for supply) and 
limited (or difficult) measurability 
(or contractibility).
By contrast, the role played by 
the agencies at the centre of the state 
sector is a limitation that can be varied, 
rather than a constraint under which 
we are compelled to operate. It was 
expected at the time of the public sector 
changes that central agencies would use 
performance information to hold chief 
executives accountable for organisational 
performance. In reality, however, we 
found relatively little (and decreasing) 
use of performance information by the 
central agencies, other than as a measure 
of bottom-line performance when 
things go wrong. The strategies we have 
proposed in this article suggest a more 
active leadership role by the centre in 
developing organisational performance 
management systems, and more actively 
using the information that emerges.
What the best strategy is for 
improving organisational performance 
through achieving outcomes-focused 
management depends on the view of the 
fundamental constraints and limitations 
on improving organisational focus on 
outcomes within the overall system. If 
the dominant problem is one of poor 
implementation rather than design flaws 
or incompleteness, the most effective 
responses are most likely to be technical 
ones, such as a product re-launch and 
greater focus on the implementation 
approach. If the dominant problem 
is the iron rule of politics, a technical 
solution based on a product re-launch is 
unlikely to be effective in achieving a step 
change, and a change in the authorising 
environment may be required. No change 
to the legislation underpinning the public 
management system, for example, will 
fundamentally change Ladley’s iron rule. 
Next steps
This article has set out a range of possible 
strategies for developing the system of 
organisational performance management 
to focus on improving the overall 
effectiveness of the state sector in achieving 
outcomes. Regardless of the broad strategy, 
or mix of strategies, chosen, important 
implementation issues and challenges will 
need to be addressed, including leadership 
and capability-building, and realism needed 
about the resources and time required to 
move forward.
A seasoned Wellington commentator 
has classified the capabilities of 
New Zealand public agencies to manage 
for outcomes as follows: organisations 
‘either don’t have the data; have the data 
and lack the ability to interpret it; or 
have the data and capability, and have 
never tried’. While this judgement may be 
harsh, the implication is correct. Using 
performance information to manage 
for outcomes may not be a holy grail, 
though it is certainly a long quest. The 
quest requires a sustained commitment 
of resources to build the capability 
dedicated to measuring outcomes and 
the effectiveness of interventions. Pursuit 
of the quest is analytically challenging 
and expensive, requiring time, sustained 
investment, commitment and leadership 
within public agencies.
The strategies proposed in this article 
have presented options for what could 
be removed from the performance 
management system, as well as what may 
need to be added. Half-hearted change, 
which adds new features to an already 
cluttered system without removing 
other components, is likely to make 
system performance worse. Addressing 
this problem will require proper system 
design that integrates new components 
into the formal system and reduces or 
removes others.
Making progress will also require 
effective concerted leadership from the 
agencies at the centre. That leadership 
will need to be based on an informed 
understanding of the positive role of 
performance measures, as well as of 
the inherent limits in terms of gaming, 
cheating, limited coverage (synecdoche) 
and complexity. The starting point 
is that those who act – and exercise 
accountability – must have a degree of 
self-awareness of the perspectives that 
they bring to bear to particular issues. 
The numbers never speak for themselves, 
and inevitably there is some subjectivity 
around their meaning. Bedding in this 
change will require greater sophistication 
from the agencies at the centre to manage 
the inherent tensions.
Leadership, capability-building and 
adequate resources are necessary, but they 
are insufficient on their own. Managerial 
solutions cannot, by themselves, address 
what are principally political problems – 
they will not take the politics out of politics. 
To be effective, the strategies will need to 
recognise the reality of the ‘two cultures’ 
of the political world. Anchoring the 
changes we have suggested for achieving 
a step change in public management 
in New Zealand will require building a 
shared and sustained understanding and 
commitment from all those involved – 
managers and staff in departments as well 
as ministers. Achieving the changes in 
practice will require sustained and astute 
leadership from the centre and concerted 
effort from line agencies. A system that is 
cluttered by the debris of previously failed 
changes is an entirely predictable outcome 
from a half-hearted approach to change. 
We owe it to New Zealanders to do better 
than that.
1 Outcomes-focused organisations are those whose resources, 
processes and outputs are shaped by the desire to achieve an 
explicit outcome or result: the Land Transport Safety network 
discussed in chapter 13 of Gill, 2008 provides a good New 
Zealand example of working in this way.
2 The land transport network case study is the exception to the 
rule: ‘If you don’t achieve them then it’s a constant whipping 
that you get every year when … the target hasn’t been met’ 
(Gill, 2008, p.346).
3 ‘Interventions’ is jargon for a variety of policy instruments, 
including outputs, specific taxes, transfers and regulation.
4 For a discussion of the requirements for an effective 
strategic management system, including political leadership, 
bureaucratic capability, the quality of outcomes information 
and clarity of analysis, see State Services Commission, 
1998.
5 The government’s strategic priorities are the priorities it 
wishes to pursue through a variety of policy interventions. 
There is an important distinction between ‘outcomes’ and 
‘government priorities’, a phrase that has more general 
coverage. Government priorities may address interventions, 
capability-building and so on in addition to outcomes.
6 ‘Attest audits’ involve the auditor providing a clear expression 
of opinion, based on their review and assessment of the 
conclusions drawn from evidence obtained in the course of 
the audit. Attest audits are intended to provide assurance 
about the written assertions made by the party that has been 
audited (NZICA, 2006, pp.317-18).
7 Section 26I of the Public Finance Act 1989 requires a fiscal 
strategy report each year with the Budget which includes 
explanations of variations and changes from the previous 
year’s report; section 26N requires a statement on the long-
term (40 years) fiscal position at least every four years.
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exercise in compliance. Do managers in the New 
Zealand state sector actively use performance 
information in decision-making?
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performance information for control purposes, 
rather than solely as an exercise in compliance 
(which in part it is). What emerged within public 
agencies was the picture of an iron cage of 
control based on performance measurement. 
This was not how the designers of the formal 
system envisaged performance information would 
be used. The book concludes with proposals 
for the ongoing development of organisational 
performance management in New Zealand.
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One of the problems we have in answering 
these questions is the lack of a shared 
understanding of the attributes of good-
quality regulation. Arguably, a shared 
understanding would help mobilise and 
co-ordinate dispersed knowledge of how 
the law is working in practice, and give us 
a better appreciation at any point in time 
of the health of our regulatory regimes. 
This article identifies a set of best practice 
regulatory principles and associated 
performance indicators and, while 
recognising the limitations of hindsight, 
explores the possibility that applying 
these principles would have given us early 
warning of the weaknesses in the 1991 
building control regime.
Regulatory regimes as experiments
We often have an idealised or optimistic 
view of regulation based on what we believe 
it will deliver by way of outcomes, be they 
economic, social or both. It is generally 
articulated, at least by the proponents of 
a particular regulatory approach, at the 
time that approach is being developed and 
implemented. However, the reality can fall 
short of the ideal, so much so on some 
occasions that the regulatory approach is 
considered to have failed and a new ideal 
is articulated. This pattern of optimism 
followed by disappointment followed by 
optimism can be observed over time and 
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How good is our regulation? Are there opportunities for 
improvement through either materially rethinking how we 
regulate or a process of continuous improvement? Are there 
latent weaknesses in our regimes which may result in, for 
example, another ‘leaky building’ situation?
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and Detecting 
Vulnerabilities across different regulatory areas. It can also be observed in pendulum swings between 
different regulatory approaches, which 
often take the form of slogans – such as 
‘light-handed’ versus ‘heavy-handed’, 
‘prescriptive’ versus ‘principles’ or ‘more’ 
versus ‘less’ government. 
But excessive optimism or pessimism, 
pendulum swings and slogans are not 
necessarily helpful to rational policy 
making. It would be better to reflect the 
reality that for the most part regulatory 
regimes are experiments: in other words, 
when a new regime is put in place we 
do not know in advance precisely how it 
will work in practice. It may well be that 
the assumptions and evidence on which 
the regime is based are robust, based 
on generally acceptable standards for 
the quality of policy advice. The regime 
might also work in the intended manner 
in most circumstance and most of the 
time. However, we must also acknowledge 
that the environment in which regulation 
operates, and that it is intended to 
influence, is highly complex and often 
unstable. For example, population groups 
are heterogeneous and what might work 
for one group may not for another. The 
performance of regulators themselves is 
influenced by a range of incentives and 
underlying capabilities (see Bardach and 
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Kagan, 1982 for an analysis of factors 
which affect regulator performance). Over 
time societal expectations, technologies 
and markets all change, which means that 
regimes which may have worked at one 
point in time might not at another. 
Anticipating all the circumstances that 
a regulatory regime is likely to encounter 
at any point in time, and over time, and 
predicting how the regime will work in 
those circumstances is beyond human 
capability. If we do accept, nevertheless, 
the proposition that regulatory regimes 
are experiments, and novel regimes even 
more so, then constant monitoring and 
evaluation over time are critical. How 
should this be done? I would like to 
propose three elements of a strategy. 
The first is that there is a shared 
agreement within the regulatory and policy 
communities and with key stakeholders 
on the generic attributes of good-quality 
regulation. This goes further than simply 
agreeing on regulatory objectives and 
the means of achieving them. Within 
an experimental frame our interest is 
in those attributes that contribute to 
the robustness of the regime and to 
its durability. Secondly, there is timely 
feedback on how regulatory regimes are 
performing in practice, relative to these 
attributes. Thirdly, there is the capacity 
to evaluate the feedback – to sort the 
wheat from the chaff – and a willingness 
to act when the situation requires it, 
based on empirical evidence and sound 
judgement. 
Within an experimental frame one aim 
is to improve regulatory regimes through 
a process of continuous improvement. 
We have also learnt from experience that 
an equally important aim is to minimise 
the risk of regulatory failure, with its 
associated social and economic costs.
Attributes of best practice regulation
What are the attributes of good-quality 
regulation? Drawing on a range of sources, 
including OECD and APEC documents, 
and guidelines and directives produced by 
many governments around the world,1 the 
Treasury has codified a set of attributes in 
the form of principles and performance 
indicators (as set out Table 1). 
The second of these attributes is 
proportionality, which is expressed as the 
Table 1: Best practice regulation principles and indicators
The principles have been drawn from Treasury experience and cross-checked against OECD, APEC 
and World Bank principles, and principles that have been adopted in comparable jurisdictions 
such as the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, and against earlier New Zealand 
principles, in particular the Code of Good Regulatory Practice.
Attribute Principle Indicators
Growth-
supporting
Economic 
objectives are given 
an appropriate 
weighting relative 
to other specified 
objectives
1. Identifying and justifying trade-offs between 
economic and other objectives is an explicit 
part of decision making 
2. The need for firms to take long-term 
investment decisions is taken into account in 
regulatory regimes where appropriate
3. Open and competitive domestic and 
international markets an explicit objective
Proportional The burden of 
rules and their 
enforcement should 
be proportionate to 
the benefits that are 
expected to result
1. A risk-based, cost-benefit framework is in 
place for both rule-making and enforcement
2. There is an empirical foundation to regulatory 
judgements
Flexible and 
durable
Regulated entities 
should have scope 
to adopt least-cost 
and innovative 
approaches to 
meeting legal 
obligations 
The regulatory 
system has 
the capacity to 
evolve to respond 
to changing 
circumstances
1. The underlying regulatory approach is 
principles- or performance-based, and policies 
and procedures are in place to ensure that it is 
administered flexibly
2. Non-regulatory measures, including self-
regulation, are used wherever possible
3. Feedback systems are in place to assess how 
the law is working in practice
4. Decisions are reassessed at regular intervals 
and when new information comes to hand
5. The regulatory regime is up to date with 
technological and market change, and 
evolving societal expectations
Certain and 
predictable 
Regulated entities 
have certainty 
as to their legal 
obligations, and 
the regulatory 
regime provides 
predictability over 
time
1. Safe harbours are available and/or regulated 
entities have access to authoritative advice 
2. Decision-making criteria are clear and provide 
certainty of process
3. The need for firms to take long-term 
investment decisions is taken into account in 
regulatory regimes where appropriate
4. There is consistency between multiple 
regulatory regimes that affect single-regulated 
entities where appropriate  
Transparent 
and 
accountable
Rules-development, 
implementation and 
enforcement should 
be transparent
1. Regulators must be able to justify decisions 
and be subject to public scrutiny
Capable 
regulators
The regulator has 
the people and 
systems necessary 
to operate an 
efficient and 
effective regulatory 
regime
1. Capacity assessments are undertaken at 
regular intervals and subject to independent 
input and/or review
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principle that the burden of rules and their 
enforcement should be proportionate to 
the benefits that are expected to result. 
Another way to describe this principle 
is that the emphasis is placed on a risk-
based, cost-benefit regulatory framework 
and risk-based decision making by 
regulators. 
Risk-based regulation requires 
consideration of the likelihood and 
consequences of an adverse event and the 
costs of mitigating the risk. It assumes 
that risk cannot be taken out of people’s 
lives, and hence it sets a threshold for 
state intervention. Underpinning risk-
based regulation is both evidence and 
judgement. In many situations the 
evidence we need is science-based, and 
this requires us to have particular regard 
to the linkages between the regulatory 
and science systems. But information 
is also required on the community’s 
tolerance for risk, having regard to the 
cost of mitigating the risk (there is a rich 
risk literature (for example, see Bryner, 
1994; Kraft and Vig, 1988; Vogel, 1986; 
Brown, 1987; Breyer and Heyvaert, 2000; 
Slovic, 1987; Sapolsky, 1986; HM Treasury, 
1996)).
Judgement is necessary because 
evidence is often incomplete. The 
exercise of judgement is a cognitive 
process and in designing regimes that 
rely on judgement we must have regard 
to the characteristics of those who are to 
exercise it. The literature on expertise and 
wisdom provides signposts to what those 
characteristics are. For example, it makes 
a clear distinction between those who are 
competent and those who are expert, the 
latter being able to make accurate intuitive 
judgements in complex decision-making 
contexts where there is a high level of 
uncertainty (useful sources on expertise 
are Ross, 2006 and Ericsson et al., 2006). 
Experts are likely to have a minimum of 
ten years’ experience, leading to the ‘ten-
year rule’, but experience is only one of 
the conditions. K. Anders Ericsson of 
Florida State University has concluded 
that ‘what matters is not experience per 
se, but “effortful study”, which entails 
continually taking challenges that lie just 
beyond one’s competence’ (Ross, 2006). 
It is highly risky to implement a regime 
which requires expertise without an 
assurance that the right sort of experts 
are involved in decision making.
The fourth of the attributes is 
certainty. This is the principle that the 
regulatory system should be predictable 
so as to provide certainty to regulated 
entities, and be consistent with other 
policies. Regulated entities require 
certainty because this reduces the costs 
and risks associated with compliance, 
not just now but into the future. Small 
and medium-sized enterprises are often 
singled out as those which particularly 
value certainty ‘here and now’. The idea 
that regulatory regimes should provide 
certainty over time is also of particular 
importance to some regulated entities: 
for example, firms which have to make 
long-term investment decisions, either 
in innovation, markets or infrastructure, 
where the cost is upfront but the pay-off 
will be influenced by regulatory settings 
or decision making at a future time. 
Regulators also value certainty as it makes 
clear what they have to enforce, and so 
the job of enforcement easier. 
Indicators of a regulatory system which 
provides certainty are the availability of 
safe harbours and access to authoritative 
advice; decision-making criteria that is 
clear and provides certainty of process; 
and evidence that the need for firms to 
take long-term investment decisions 
is taken into account in the design of 
regulatory regimes. 
The third attribute is flexibility. This 
is reflected in the principle that regulated 
entities should have scope to adopt 
least-cost and innovative approaches to 
meeting legal obligations. Indicators of 
a regulatory regime that is flexible are 
that the underlying regulatory approach 
is principles- or performance-based and 
policies and procedures are in place to 
ensure that it is administered flexibly, and 
that non-regulatory measures, including 
self-regulation, are used wherever 
possible.
There can be tension between the 
attributes of certainty and flexibility. 
Providing for safe harbours such as 
deemed-to-comply standards within 
a principles- or performance-based 
regime is intended to resolve this tension, 
but many would acknowledge that 
configuring a regulatory regime such that 
both attributes are optimally reflected is 
a challenge. 
Closely associated with flexibility 
is durability: the principle that the 
regulatory system has the capacity to 
evolve to respond to new information and 
changing circumstances. Flexibility and 
durability can be two sides of the same 
coin. That is, a regime that is flexible is 
more likely to be durable, so long as the 
conditions are in place for the regime to 
‘learn’. Indicators of durability are that 
there are feedback systems in place to 
assess how the law is working in practice; 
decisions are reassessed at regular 
intervals and when new information 
comes to hand; and the regulatory regime 
is up to date with technological change. 
Adaptive efficiency and double-loop 
learning are amongst the techniques or 
systems that facilitate such learning (see 
Best Practice Regulation: Setting Targets and Detecting Vulnerabilities
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system which treats regulatory regimes as 
experiments that require both ongoing monitoring 
and evaluation and consequential adjustments to 
ensure that the regimes continue to be effective 
and efficient. 
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Driesen, 2004; Oregon State University, 
2002; Smith, 2001).
The fifth of the attributes is jointly 
transparency and accountability. These 
are reflected in the principle that rules-
development and enforcement should be 
transparent. In essence, regulators must 
be able to justify decisions and be subject 
to public scrutiny. The transparency and 
accountability principle includes non-
discrimination, provision for appeals 
and sound legal basis for decisions.
The sixth attribute is capable 
regulators: specifically, that the regulator 
has the people and systems necessary 
to operate an efficient and effective 
regulatory regime. A key indicator of 
a regime that provides an assurance of 
capability is that capability assessments 
are undertaken at regular intervals and 
subject to independent input and/or 
review.
There is a seventh attribute which 
is associated with a particular outcome, 
and hence to some extent differs from 
the previous six in so far as they could 
be seen as intermediate objectives. This 
is growth-supporting, the principle 
being that economic objectives are given 
an appropriate weighting relative to 
other specified objectives. These other 
objectives could be related to health, 
safety or environmental protection 
or consumer and investor protection. 
Economic objectives include impacts 
on competition, innovation, exports 
and compliance costs, and trade and 
investment openness. An indicator 
of a regulatory regime that embodies 
this attribute is that the identification 
and justification of trade-offs between 
economic and other objectives are an 
explicit part of decision making. It 
does not assume that growth should be 
given prominence over other important 
outcomes; rather it responds to a belief 
that growth as an objective is not always 
given due weight.
Best practice regulatory principles 
have value within an overall regulatory 
quality management system which treats 
regulatory regimes as experiments that 
require both ongoing monitoring and 
evaluation and consequential adjustments 
to ensure that the regimes continue to 
be effective and efficient. Such principles 
are a codification of knowledge that 
exists, but is not necessarily shared 
by those who have responsibility for 
monitoring and evaluating regimes 
and those who have responsibility for 
the delivery of regulatory outcomes. 
They are also not necessarily shared by 
those who may have knowledge of how 
regulatory regimes are working on the 
ground. Shared principles can have a 
normative and persuasive effect, but also 
act as benchmarks against which the 
many actors in the system – those who 
monitor and evaluate, regulatory policy 
agencies and regulators, and stakeholders 
– hold each other to account.
Can monitoring against best practice 
principles help reveal latent weaknesses in 
regulatory regimes?
Within an experimental frame, 
continuous improvement, or a drive to 
reach the regulatory best practice frontier, 
is an important objective. Equally 
important is the early detection of the 
potential for regulatory failure. Through 
a retrospective application of the best 
practice regulatory principles to the 1991 
building control regime, this section 
explores the possibility that proactive 
monitoring against them would have 
revealed latent weaknesses in the regime. 
Regulatory failure results when 
a regulatory regime does not deliver 
what society reasonably expects it to 
deliver. The costs can be very significant. 
The failure of the building control 
regime which was introduced by the 
Building Act, 1991 affects at least 42,000 
homes at a cost of at least $11.3 billion 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009). Could 
latent weaknesses in the 1991 building 
control regime have been identified 
beforehand, and the likelihood of 
ultimate failure lessened? 
Novel regulatory regimes are 
inherently more experimental than 
established regimes, and the 1991 
building control regime was particularly 
novel. Not only did it embody a novel 
regulatory approach – specifically, 
performance-based regulation – but it 
was also a uniquely pure application of 
a performance-based philosophy (May, 
2003), compared with building control 
regimes in other countries which have 
retained quite a prescriptive character.
What makes performance-based 
regulation novel? I will highlight three 
features. The first is associated with 
its underlying regulatory philosophy. 
Performance-based regulation sets goals 
and is deliberately not overly prescriptive 
about how to achieve them. These goals 
can have varying degrees of specificity: 
in some cases they can be quite general, 
such as the need to achieve adequate 
levels of safety, but with no definition 
of what ‘adequate’ means. Therefore, a 
defining feature of performance-based 
regulation is that it is more reliant on 
expert judgment, at least relative to a 
prescriptive regime based on standards 
refined over time through a process of 
trial and error (Mumford, 2011, p.111).
Secondly, the case for performance-
based regulation is often made on the 
basis that it will facilitate innovation, often 
technological innovation: for example, 
a new building technology. Innovation 
typically involves some degree of risk-
taking, and it is a reasonable conclusion 
that performance-based regulation is 
in many cases a policy experiment to 
facilitate technological experimentation. 
This was evident in the leaky-building 
The failure of the building control regime which  
was introduced by the Building Act, 1991 affects  
at least 42,000 homes at a cost of at least  
$11.3 billion ...
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example. The combination of monolithic 
cladding, untreated timber, complex 
building designs, adverse weather 
conditions, and a lack of sensitivity by 
building practitioners to the vulnerabilities 
of this combination resulted in a failed 
technological innovation, to such an 
extent that it resulted in the failure of the 
innovative regulatory regime.
The third feature is that performance-
based regulation is often adopted as 
a reaction to prescriptive regulation 
(Mumford, 2011, pp.8-9). Prescriptive 
regulatory regimes are often highly path-
dependent and deeply embedded. Such 
regimes are therefore familiar to those 
who administer them, and to those who 
are required to comply. They may not 
like the regime; they may find it heavy 
handed, costly and inflexible. But they 
are conditioned through experience to 
working with it and have developed 
relevant behaviours and capabilities. 
The shift from prescriptive to 
performance-based regulation therefore 
is a material shift as it inevitably requires 
new capabilities and behaviours. These 
are required across the spectrum, from 
regulators to regulated entities, expert 
bodies, and consumers or investors. 
New institutions may also be required, 
to collect, assess and diffuse information 
and identify and reinforce appropriate 
behaviours. It should be noted that the 
challenges of regime change are not 
unique to performance-based regulation; 
but they are likely to arise in most if not 
all regime-change contexts.
It is argued here that monitoring of 
the 1991 building control regime against 
the best practice principles may have 
revealed a regime that was vulnerable to 
failure. 
By way of background, the 1991 
Building Act put in place a performance-
based building framework. The purpose 
of the act was to ensure that buildings 
were safe and healthy for those who used 
them, but an important objective of the 
new regime was to encourage innovation 
in the building and construction industry 
(Mumford, 2011, p.11). The way the regime 
reflected this objective was through 
the performance-based building code 
and provision for both alternative and 
acceptable solutions. Acceptable solutions 
were the old prescriptive standards, 
and compliance with an acceptable 
solution was deemed compliance with 
the performance requirements in the 
building code. Alternative solutions were 
one-off designs, and territorial authorities 
were required to determine whether, 
on reasonable grounds, the designs 
met the sometimes quite general code 
requirements. In making their decisions, 
the territorial authorities could and 
often did draw on expert advice, and in 
situations of doubt or dispute they could 
seek a determination from the Building 
Industry Authority.
Buildings that leaked resulting 
in damage were not compliant with 
the performance requirements of the 
building code. In effect, the judgement 
exercised by territorial authorities when 
giving consent to monolithic-clad 
building designs, and inspecting such 
buildings in the course of construction, 
was wrong. However, the 1991 regime did 
not fail because some buildings leaked. 
The regime failed because a very large 
number of buildings leaked causing 
significant damage, economic cost and 
social hardship over an extended period 
of time.
Had we assessed the building control 
regime against the best regulatory 
practice principles in, say, the mid-1990s, 
we probably would have said that the 
growth-supporting objective was reflected 
in the regime. Innovation, and for that 
matter compliance-cost reduction, 
were important considerations in the 
administration of the regime. We would 
similarly have been comfortable, I expect, 
with the flexibility the regime provided 
through the alternative solutions route. 
We may have been comfortable with the 
certainty that was provided by deemed-
to-comply acceptable solutions, but 
could have picked up a concern that the 
lack of detail in consent applications 
led to uncertainty about whether plans 
and specifications did in fact meet the 
performance requirements in the Building 
Code (Government Administration 
Committee, 2003, p.31). It is doubtful 
that we would have identified significant 
issues in relation to transparency and 
accountability in the mid-1990s, although 
accountability issues were highlighted in 
the various analyses of the leaky building 
crisis (May, 2003, p.397).
We may have been less sanguine about 
proportionality. There was apparently no 
formal risk assessment of new building 
technologies, such as monolithic cladding, 
having regard to the state of the building 
sciences, information being volunteered 
by industry participants and drawn from 
overseas experience, the objectives of 
the Building Act and the performance 
requirements of the Building Code. To 
the extent that risk-based judgements 
were made, they were permissive rather 
than precautionary (Mumford, 2011, 
p.83). Another way of saying this is that 
the regulators put a lot of weight on 
the innovation objective and less weight 
on acquiring and weighing evidence 
on the efficacy of innovative building 
technologies. 
We would also most likely have been 
concerned about durability, as it has 
been couched in the Treasury principles 
and performance indicators with their 
emphasis on the need for robust feedback 
The passage of the 1991 Building Act presaged 
a new regulatory environment which shifted the 
responsibility for decision making from standards 
committees .... to territorial authorities, building 
certifiers, designers and builders and their 
advisrers.
Best Practice Regulation: Setting Targets and Detecting Vulnerabilities
Policy Quarterly – Volume 7, Issue 3 – August 2011 – Page 41
systems to monitor and evaluate how 
the law is working in practice. In the 
context of the building control regime, 
the assessment and associated feedback 
loops would have been against the 
primary purpose of the act, which was 
health and safety, and against the key 
objective of innovation in the building 
and construction industry. It should have 
taken into account how novel building 
technologies were performing in the 
field given uncertainties about how they 
would perform in all the circumstances 
of their use. It is clear in the building 
code case that there was not a robust 
monitoring and evaluation framework. 
As a consequence, important knowledge 
about the performance of new building 
technologies, and the implications of this 
for the consenting and inspection process, 
were not revealed and assimilated into 
the building control system in a timely 
manner (Mumford, 2011, p.83). 
Another of the principles we would 
have been concerned about is capability. 
The passage of the 1991 Building Act 
presaged a new regulatory environment 
which shifted the responsibility for 
decision making from standards 
committees, who, for the most part, make 
changes at the margin to existing building 
standards on the basis of a consensus 
of technical experts and community 
representatives, to territorial authorities, 
building certifiers, designers and builders 
and their advisers. This was a material 
shift, given that the decisions that 
needed to be made required significant 
judgement, not just in relation to technical 
matters but also on the community’s risk 
preferences. It demanded a higher level of 
technical expertise, as well as input from 
those in the community who were able to 
contribute to the judgements on what is 
an acceptable risk.
In the final analysis, it is clear that 
those who were required to make such 
judgements lacked the expertise to do 
so. This did not appear to have been 
recognised as an implementation issue 
for the regime, or, if it was recognised, 
not acted upon (Mumford, 2011, p.83).
Conclusion
I have briefly outlined two propositions. 
The first is that regulatory regimes 
are experiments, and novel regulatory 
regimes are particularly experimental. 
The second is that it is possible to codify 
a generic set of best practice principles 
and performance indicators that can be 
applied at the regime level as benchmarks 
for design and administration, and at the 
systems level to gauge how well policy 
experiments are working.
I have attempted to demonstrate, by 
reference to the failure of the 1991 building 
control regime, how treating the regime as 
an experiment and assessing it against the 
principles, having regard to the particular 
vulnerabilities of performance-based 
regulation as a class of regulation and the 
challenges of regime change, may have 
revealed weaknesses within the regime 
which increased the risk of failure. 
Performance-based regulation is a 
particular class of regulation that reflects 
certain objectives and similar design 
features, and has certain vulnerabilities 
associated with these. A shared objective 
is a regulatory regime which facilitates 
innovation, and this is done through a 
regulatory design which values flexibility. 
A key vulnerability arises when innovation 
involves risk-taking; flexibility requires 
expert judgement, as the efficacy of such 
a regime depends on having the right 
people making the decisions, and robust 
feedback loops and a capacity to respond 
appropriately to that feedback. It is an 
increasingly popular class of regulation 
(OECD, 2002; External Advisory 
Committee on Smart Regulation, 2004).
So the 1991 building control regime 
was not unique, at least in relation to 
certain key attributes. It was unique in so 
far as it failed. Does this reduce its value 
as an analogy for other performance-
based regulatory regimes? In other 
words, was the combination of factors 
that led to the failure specific to the 
built environment? The answer must be 
that while performance-based regulatory 
regimes may not necessarily fail, the 
building case demonstrates that they can 
fail, and as public policy advisers it is 
incumbent on us to minimise the risk of 
failure.
In complex decision-making contexts 
we often revert to heuristics, or ‘rules 
of thumb’. In an experimental frame 
the two that we might emphasise are 
‘thinking ahead’ and ‘thinking along 
the way’ (Amanda Wolf, personal 
communication). Thinking ahead in the 
regulation context means being aware 
of the many things that could go wrong, 
based on a good historical understanding 
of the strengths and weaknesses of 
different classes of regulation. Thinking 
along the way means taking a real-world 
approach by asking what is happening in 
practice and whether this is consistent 
with the objectives, and being prepared 
to adjust the regime as you go. 
I will conclude with two questions. 
The Treasury initiative to describe a set 
of best regulatory practice principles 
and performance indicators assumes 
that we are able to apply these across the 
broad range of regulation as an initial 
diagnosis of whether there is potential 
for improvement within regimes – to 
shift closer to the best practice frontier 
– and to detect latent weaknesses which 
may result in regulatory failure. However, 
at one level regulatory regimes are not 
the same. While they may have a similar 
underlying philosophy, and performance-
based regulation is an example of this, 
they have different design features and the 
context in which they apply is different. 
Is it possible that in applying a generic 
set of principles and indicators we miss 
Table 2: Retrospective assessment of 1991 building control regime against best practice principles
Grey = strong indication of concern; dark blue = possible area of concern; Light blue = no significant concerns
Growth-
supporting Proportional Flexible Durable
Certain 
and
predictable 
Transparent 
and 
accountable 
Capable 
regulators 
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something fundamental to the efficacy of 
a regime?
My second question reflects an 
alternative view. In this highly complex 
world in which we live, will a set of 
partial indicators, which the best practice 
principles inevitably are, applied widely 
as benchmarks and an initial diagnostic 
and early warning device, cast more 
daylight on the performance of our 
regulatory regimes than would otherwise 
be the case? 
1 For example, see OECD, 1995, 1997; President of the 
United States, 1993, 2011; Coalition of Australian 
Governments, 2007; APEC and OECD, 2005.
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